Introduction
In April 2001, Ellen Roche--a healthy, twenty-four year-old woman--volunteered to participate in an asthma study conducted by the Johns Hopkins Asthma and Allergy Center, where she worked as a technician.
[FN1] In exchange for $365, she agreed to inhale a "medication that . . . stopp[ed] some nerves in [her] airways from functioning for a short period" in order to test a hypothesis about the workings of asthma.
[FN2] Although one of the two previous test subjects had experienced shortness of breath and developed a cough after inhaling the solution, the researchers continued the study. Ellen was hospitalized five days after her initial inhalation, and she died twenty-four days later.
[FN3] Investigations into Ellen's death later revealed that the researchers had disregarded many of the federal rules designed to protect vulnerable research subjects like her. These violations included the researchers' failure to tell the body overseeing their actions of the prior subject's problem until after Ellen was hospitalized; the director of the study's failure to account for literature *894 showing that the substance administered could have pulmonary toxic effects; and failure to disclose to potential research subjects that the substance administered was not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [FN4] 1. Assurances.--The Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) [FN45] is responsible for implementing the Common Rule and for providing guidance on ethical issues in all federally sponsored or federally affiliated biomedical research. [FN46] The Common Rule currently requires that any institution that conducts federally funded human-subject research [FN47] submit to the department or agency sponsoring that research a written assurance that its researchers will comply with all of the requirements of the Common Rule.
[FN48] Until December 2001, the OHRP approved three types of assurances: Single Project Assurances (SPAs), which apply to a single research activity at a single location; Multiple Project Assurances (MPAs), which cover multiple--often unrelated--research activities at a single location; and Cooperative Project Assurances *900 (CPAs), which cover multiple research activities at multiple locations. The Common Rule specifies the elements of a valid assurance.
[FN53] Each research institution must develop and promise to follow a "statement of principles . . . in the discharge of its responsibilities for protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects of research conducted at or sponsored by the institution, regardless of whether the research is subject to federal regulation." [FN54] Thus, in exchange for receiving federal funds for some of its research, an institution agrees to comply with the ethical requirements of either the Belmont Report or a similar set of ethical principles acceptable to OHRP for all of its research--whether privately or federally funded. [FN55] a. The Inherent Weakness of IRBs.--The efficacy of the current protections of human research subjects requires proper monitoring of research protocols by IRBs. Over the three decades since the promulgation of the Common Rule, however, research involving human subjects has grown exponentially [FN76] and now exceeds the monitoring capabilities of *904 existing IRBs. Indeed, due in part to increased corporate sponsorship of research, in the last decade the average IRB has gone from reviewing approximately forty protocols per year to reviewing more than three hundred. [FN77] To further complicate matters, medical research has become increasingly complex and decentralized over the past decade. [FN78] At the time of the Common Rule's inception, medical research typically involved a single researcher at a single institution, but the research landscape has changed dramatically over the past decade alone. [FN79] Research protocols are now often conducted at many different locations simultaneously and involve large numbers of researchers and research subjects. [FN80] This emergence of large, multicenter--sometimes international--clinical trials, coupled with an increase in funding (and a shift from primarily government to primarily corporate sponsorship) has "made apparent the inadequacy of mechanisms for protecting patient-subjects" [FN81] --mechanisms that were developed during a period when clinical research was much simpler and conducted on a much smaller scale. This has caused many people--from both inside and outside the medical research community--to conclude that existing IRBs are simply not equipped to handle these multisite trials. [FN82] Due to recent, highly publicized fatalities, IRBs have come under increasing pressure to perform their role as the official watchdogs of research involving human subjects. [FN83] Moreover, although the regulations have been supplemented over the years, institutional support given to IRBs is often minimal. [FN84] As early as June 1998, the Office of the Inspector General of DHHS issued four investigative reports that concluded that IRBs had excessive workloads *905 and inadequate resources. [FN85] IRB oversight at several institutions was described as "inadequate," [FN86] and DHHS also found that, on occasion, researchers were not providing the IRBs with enough information to allow them to evaluate clinical trials effectively. [FN87] All of these factors combine to create a dangerous situation for research subjects. b. A Fundamental Paradigm Shift in Medical Research.--The inherent weakness of IRBs has become particularly salient of late, as medical research in the past two decades has undergone a fundamental paradigm shift from primarily nontherapeutic research (i.e., research that promises no therapeutic benefit to the subject) to primarily therapeutic research (i.e., research that purports to provide a therapeutic benefit to the subject). [FN88] The earliest protections for subjects of medical experimentation emphasized the risks and burdens of research and the consequent need to protect potential and actual research subjects from abuse and exploitation. [FN89] The ethical guidelines for this type of research, therefore, focused on ensuring that subjects gave voluntary and informed consent. [FN90] As the medical community's focus has shifted from nontherapeutic research to therapeutic research, there has been a corresponding shift away from the traditional, paternalistic view of research ethics toward a view that emphasizes access. [FN91] Because modern medical research may offer the best hope for a cure to the sufferers of debilitating or fatal conditions, *906 it is crucial that these therapies, although experimental, are available to as many people as possible. The emerging access-centered model of ethics reflects the medical community's desire to ensure that all people have equal access to potentially lifesaving therapies, regardless of race, nationality, or wealth. [FN92] For example, clinical trials of new therapeutic agents--such as new drugs to combat HIV and AIDS--have resulted in a move toward an access-centered model of research ethics. [FN93] This increased focus on inclusion may be partially responsible for abandonment of the essential aspects of the protectionist model that guarantee subjects' privacy and safety.
2. Other Pressures to Weaken Protections.--In addition to the larger systematic pressures discussed above, there are many other reasons why human subject protections have become weaker in recent years. Indeed, the rapid advancement of science is itself a source of pressure to weaken protections for human subjects. Times of great technological achievement are rarely accompanied by self-imposed restraint, and this is unquestionably a time of great technological achievement for medical research. Due to the dramatic increase in the funds available for medical research, the vastly improved capabilities of computers, and the fruits of earlier experimentation, medical research has progressed dramatically during the last two decades.
Conflicts of interest are another source of pressure on the system of protection. [FN94] The sharp increase in privately funded (i.e., industry sponsored) research has created an atmosphere that breeds conflicts arising from compelling financial incentives. [FN95] These conflicts may arise from researchers' financial relationships with companies whose products they are studying, whether the research is sponsored by the government or by the company itself. Critics have declared that academic researchers are "for sale," [FN96] that their engagement in clinical research can be bought or bartered, and that the outcome of research is thus biased by academic-*907 industrial alliances--whether those alliances are personal to the researcher or institutional. [FN97] One example of the result of such conflicts was revealed in a disturbing report of inappropriate subject-recruitment practices. The report, which was issued by the Office of the Inspector General of DHHS in February 2000, [FN98] focused on studies funded by drug companies [FN99] --including one "case of a woman in a nursing home who was allegedly forced to participate in a study under threat of expulsion from the home." [FN100] The report noted that aggressive recruiting by researchers who have been offered money or other inducements might be contributing to the erosion of informed consent. As researchers are pressured to recruit subjects quickly in order to discover the next big pharmacological miracle, they may misrepresent the true nature of a trial--appealing to subjects' trust. [FN101] 3. Deliberate Failure to Follow Proper Procedures.--In addition to these weaknesses in the current framework for the protection of human research subjects, there is mounting evidence that many researchers do not adhere to standards of good clinical practice, much less the more aspirational ethical guidelines of the Common Rule. Even if the Common Rule and the IRB system were perfect, incompetence or intentional ethical lapses in the zealous pursuit of advances in science or financial gain by individual researchers or teams of researchers would still be problematic. For example, the FDA has identified cases in which researchers failed to *908 disqualify subjects who did not meet the criteria for a study, failed to report adverse events as required, flouted protocol, and ignored inadequacies in the staff's training. [FN102] These were not isolated instances; these problems, among others, have occurred at some of the nation's best-known and most prestigious research centers, in some instances implicating "leaders in their fields of study." [FN103] a. The Jesse Gelsinger Case.--On September 17, 1999, an eighteen year-old college student named Jesse Gelsinger died while participating in research conducted by the University of Pennsylvania's Institute for Gene Therapy. [FN104] Jesse volunteered for a clinical trial of a new treatment for ornithine transcarbamylase (OTC) deficiency, a rare metabolic disorder that affects the body's ability to metabolize ammonia. [FN105] The severity of OTC varies widely from patient to patient; Jesse "suffered from a relatively mild form" [FN106] of the disease, which was controlled with a low-protein diet and medication. [FN107] The clinical trial in which Jesse participated used a strain of the common cold virus as a "viral vector" to transport new genetic material directly to the subject's liver. [FN108] Jesse was injected with the viral vector on September 13, 1999, after which he suffered from a host of serious complications, including a blood-clotting disorder, kidney failure, lung failure, and, ultimately, brain death. [FN109] Investigation of Jesse's death revealed that he had not been an appropriate candidate for the study [FN110] and that information regarding the severe adverse reactions of other participants had been withheld. [FN111] This gross deviation from the standards set forth in the Common Rule resulted in the suspension of the *909 University's gene therapy program. [FN112] The Gelsinger family filed suit soon after Jesse's death. A settlement agreement, the details of which have not been publicly disclosed, was reached on November 3, 2000. [FN113] 
II. Obstacles to Recovery in Tort
The inadequacy of the existing protections of human research subjects is particularly alarming because injured research subjects often lack the incentive to seek redress for their injuries in the courts. Because the Common Rule does not expressly establish a private right of action for injured research subjects, [FN114] they have had to resort to state tort law, which presents more obstacles than most plaintiffs are willing to navigate--especially if their injuries are minor. [FN115] To further complicate matters, case law interpreting--or even addressing--the Common Rule is almost nonexistent. [FN116] *910 A. Negligence
At first glance, a negligence action might appear sufficient to compensate injured research subjects and deter unethical research practices. In fact, injured research subjects have recovered via negligence actions--or at least the settlement of negligence actions. [FN117] There are various theories upon which a negligence action against offending researchers, research institutions, or IRBs could be based. [FN118] In all cases the injured plaintiff would have to prove the basic elements of a negligence cause of action: that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; that the defendant breached that duty; that the defendant's breach caused injury to the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff suffered actual damages from that injury. [FN119] Depending on the situation, injured research subjects could have a great deal of difficulty proving any one of these elements.
The threshold question in any negligence action is whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Although the existence of a duty can be established via government regulations, [FN120] only one court has found that the Common Rule as codified at 45 C.F.R. section 46 imposes a duty on the part of researchers, research institutions, or IRBs. In Grimes v. Kennedy Kreiger Institute, Inc., [FN121] young children who participated in a nontherapeutic research study funded in part by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sued the research institution for negligence based on alleged violations of the standards set forth in the Common Rule. The stated purpose of the research was to study the effectiveness of various partial lead-paint abatement procedures in order to find a level of decontamination that would be relatively safe but economical enough so that landlords would not abandon their low-income housing units. [FN122] In order to measure the effectiveness of particular abatement methods, researchers measured the presence of lead in the blood of healthy children. Poor families with very young children (preferably between five and eighteen *911 months old) were "recruited" to live in test houses in which lead paint had been abated--but not eliminated--using one of the methods under investigation for the purpose of measuring the level of lead present in these children over a period of time. [FN123] The plaintiff alleged inadequacy of informed consent, improper solicitation of subjects, and greater than minimal risk to children in a nontherapeutic study. [FN124] Reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that federal regulations (i.e., the Common Rule) created a legally cognizable duty to human subjects on the part of researchers that arose out of the unique researcher-subject relationship, [FN125] the breach of which may constitute negligence. [FN126] Although the Grimes court found that the Common Rule established a legal duty, no subsequent court has followed suit. Moreover, the Grimes court seems to have confined its opinion to the context of nontherapeutic research. [FN127] Grimes should, therefore, be viewed as an aberration, rather than as the heralding of a new judicial approach to actions brought by injured research subjects.
In fact, even if courts were willing to treat a breach of the Common Rule as tantamount to negligence per se, [FN128] this would not ensure recovery for plaintiffs. As the Grimes court concedes, even plaintiffs who are clearly wronged will not recover unless they can demonstrate that they have suffered a cognizable injury as a result of the breach. [FN129] Moreover, determining the appropriate standard of care in the research setting may be problematic. Although the Common Rule arguably sets forth a standard of care, it is unclear whether--or even how--a court would apply it against all possible defendants, given the wide range of responsibilities and capabilities of the many people involved in a research protocol. [FN130] Consider a lawsuit brought against a research institution for an IRB's negligent approval of a protocol. [FN131] Like any entity that undertakes a *912 special duty to protect others, an IRB would be negligent if it approved a protocol that a reasonable IRB in its position would have rejected. [FN132] Whether the IRB had strictly complied with the Common Rule would, of course, be relevant to the inquiry. But the Common Rule itself requires that the members of an IRB be drawn from diverse areas of expertise--both scientific and nonscientific. Given this directive, it seems unlikely that a court would interpret the Common Rule as imposing a single, fixed standard of care upon all IRB members. Instead, it would likely be construed as imposing something of a sliding standard, which would vary based upon each IRB member's particular background. The plaintiff might be forced to establish a standard of care and its breach, with respect to each member of the IRB. This would be a difficult, time-consuming, and expensive proposition.
Causation and damages--the final two elements of a negligence action--create special difficulties in the context of human research subjects. With regard to causation, it is often impossible to know whether the defendant caused a subject's injury. In many cases, the only thing that can be known is that a researcher, research institution, or IRB breached the federal regulations designed to safeguard human subjects; any damage caused by that breach could lay dormant for many years. In addition, it may be particularly difficult for subjects of therapeutic research, who received experimental treatments for preexisting physical or psychological ailments, to establish proximate causation and damages. [FN133] B. Other Avenues of Recovery Other possible bases for lawsuits brought by research subjects include invasion of privacy, breach of a duty of confidentiality, or--in the context of research involving physically invasive procedures--trespass or medical battery. [FN134] Long before the advent of IRBs, the leading case in the area of medical battery was Bonner v. Moran, [FN135] in which a child sued doctors who had tried to transfer skin from him to his burned cousin *913 without his mother's consent. [FN136] Although Bonner did not involve research, it provides a nice analogy to nontherapeutic research, because it involved medical intervention from which the patient-plaintiff would not directly benefit. [FN137] The court held that, although children may sometimes give effective informed consent to treatment when they stand to benefit directly, this principle did not apply where the treatment was to benefit someone else. The physician's liability was, therefore, predicated on his failure to obtain parental consent.
[FN138] Much more recently, in Grimes, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that even parental consent is ineffective in the context of nontherapeutic research that poses more than a minimal risk to a minor child. [FN139] In the context of behavioral or social science research, a subject might recover if she suffered some sort of mental injury [FN140] as a proximate result of the researchers' negligence in conducting the experiment. [FN141] In addition, recovery based on breach of confidentiality would be possible if information revealed for the purposes of research was leaked and the plaintiff suffered injury as a result (loss of employment, for example). [FN142] *914 Each of the causes of action discussed above is highly speculative and presents difficult obstacles that plaintiffs must surmount before any recovery is possible. The next Part will consider whether injured research subjects should be able to bring a cause of action sounding in contract.
III. A Cause of Action Sounding in Contract
This Part describes the law of third-party beneficiary contracts and considers other contexts in which courts have been willing to allow third parties to enforce contracts of assurance between the federal government and a state or private entity that is the recipient of federal funding. In general, there are three ways in which persons who are not parties to, but benefit from, a federal contract can seek redress upon breach of contract. First, such persons can--and often must--pursue any available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. [FN143] Second, such persons may be able to assert a private right of action based on the statute that authorized the contract. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has become increasingly reluctant to recognize such implied rights of action. [FN144] Third, such persons may be able to assert standing as third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the government and the breaching party.
[FN145] A significant number of third-party beneficiary claims have been brought in the context of welfare-related public contracts; [FN146] but courts have often denied third-party beneficiary standing in cases where one would expect the opposite result. [FN147] Some commentators have suggested that this reveals a failure on the part of courts to disaggregate congressional *915 and administrative agency intent and a consequent failure to distinguish between implied rights of action and third-party standing. [FN148] A. Third-Party Beneficiary Doctrine
In general, a third-party beneficiary contract is an agreement under which the promisor, in exchange for something from the promisee, agrees to render his performance for the benefit of a third party, who can enforce the contract. [FN149] Recognition of this right of a third party to enforce a contract is something of an anomaly, inasmuch as it allows a party who has neither given consideration to, nor been in privity with, either of the contracting parties to maintain an action to enforce the contract, irrespective of whether that third party had contemporaneous knowledge of the contract's formation. [FN150] This is an exception to the traditional assumptions of common law contract doctrine and has, since its inception, resulted in inconsistency among the courts as to both analyses and outcomes. [FN151] In determining whether a plaintiff has standing as a third-party beneficiary, many courts have incorporated the test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. [FN152] The Restatement's formulation of third-party beneficiary standing turns primarily on intent. Section 302 of the Restatement categorizes beneficiaries of a contract as either "intended" or "incidental" beneficiaries: [FN153] "Intended beneficiaries" may enforce contracts, while "incidental beneficiaries" may not. [FN154] Intended beneficiaries are defined by the Restatement as follows: Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. [FN155] *916 The third-party enforcer must point to circumstances showing that the promisee had an independent intention that the third party would receive the benefit of the performance. [FN156] The third-party plaintiff does not have to prove that the promisee intended that the plaintiff have a right of enforcement [FN157] --only that the promisee intended that the plaintiff "receive the benefit of the promise." [FN158] Courts have developed two variations on the test for whether a plaintiff has standing as a third-party beneficiary to a contract. [FN159] The first applies to private contracts; the second to public and government contracts. In the context of private contracts, section 302 of the Restatement is applied as written. [FN160] Government contract cases, however, raise special difficulties for the determination of beneficiary rights. [FN161] Because every member of the public at large could potentially be considered an intended beneficiary of most government contracts, a more restrictive test for third-party beneficiary status is used, usually the test set forth in section 313 of the Restatement. [FN162] Section 313(1) adopts the general rules of third-party beneficiary enforcement from section 302 (including the "intent" test [FN163] ), while section 313(2) addresses the particular analytic problem presented by government contracts: how to differentiate among the many possible "beneficiaries" and determine who--if anyone--has enforcement rights. [FN164] Section 313(2), when read in conjunction with section 302, [FN165] grants third-party beneficiary rights in the context of a government contract only if the promisee both intended to benefit the *917 third party and intended to confer to that third party a right to enforce that benefit. [FN166] Courts have not consistently adopted the Restatement formulation; many courts have focused solely on intent to benefit, [FN167] while other courts--following section 313(2) more closely--have searched for an intent to grant standing to enforce the benefit, whether express or implied. [FN168] At least one commentator has argued that beneficiary rights to government contracts should be determined by measuring the "impact of an additional remedy" on the objectives of the relevant statute, [FN169] while others have proposed that the intent to benefit test be abandoned in favor of a test that measures "justifiable reliance" by the beneficiary in light of the surrounding commercial and social circumstances. [FN170] In addition, reliance has come to play a larger role in contract law of late, including in the courts' analyses of third-party beneficiary contract law.
[FN171]
*918 B. Third-Party Enforcement of Government Contracts of Assurance
Because of the frequency with which the government employs contracts as instruments of federal policy, recent years have been marked by a wave of cases involving third-party beneficiary claims under contracts with agencies of the federal government. [FN172] A contract of assurance is created when a statute authorizes federal funding for a specific purpose, in exchange for the recipient's promise to further that purpose in some way. [FN173] This type of arrangement has been used in the past in the context of hiring handicapped individuals pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, [FN174] compliance with Medicare regulations, [FN175] and admission of African American children to desegregated public school systems pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. [FN176] The Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed third-party beneficiary enforcement of contracts of assurance. In Lau v. Nichols, for example, the Court held that because a school district had contractually agreed to comply with standards promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW), a plaintiff class consisting of approximately two thousand non-English speaking children of Chinese ancestry enrolled in the San Francisco public schools was entitled to enforce DHEW's regulations and guidelines requiring school districts to take "affirmative steps" to rectify language deficiencies. [FN177] Further guidance on this issue may be gleaned from the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon.
[FN178] In Bossier, the *919 court held that the children of African American personnel at an Air Force base were intended beneficiaries of a funding contract between the United States and the local school district.
[FN179] The contract at issue in that case required the school district to admit those children to "white" schools in accordance with Title VI, in exchange for financial aid.
[FN180] As Professor Farnsworth points out, however, the claim in Bossier may have had "particular appeal because, had it been denied, the school board would have been left with funds for which it had not rendered its promised performance." [FN181] Courts have not, however, consistently required that there be an element of unjust enrichment in order to prevail in a case such as this. [FN182] Although there are exceptions, courts have generally been quite willing to analyze contracts according to the third-party beneficiary doctrine. [FN183] In decisions to the contrary, "[t]he most common reason given for rejecting the claim is not that the doctrine is inapplicable, but rather that the contracting parties did not intend to create a class of third party beneficiaries." [FN184] IV. Research Subjects Are Third-Party Beneficiaries with Enforcement Rights As shown above, existing law provides substantial support for the proposition that aggrieved persons can recover as third-party beneficiaries to contracts of assurance between a federal sponsor of research and a research*920 institution. [FN185] These contracts explicitly require the research institution to comply with the Common Rule in all research conducted at the institution, whether privately or federally funded. [FN186] This Part demonstrates that human research subjects are intended beneficiaries of these assurances, are a well-defined class, and that private enforcement of these contracts is entirely consistent with the goals of the Common Rule.
A. Assurances as Third-Party Beneficiary Contracts
There can be no dispute that the assurances entered into between federal agencies or departments and research facilities that conduct federally funded research are legally binding contracts in every sense of the term. Section 46.103 of the Common Rule, which describes these contracts, states that: Each institution engaged in research which is covered by this policy and which is conducted or supported by a federal department or agency shall provide written assurance satisfactory to the department or agency head that it will comply with the requirements set forth in this policy. . . . Assurances applicable to federally supported or conducted research shall at a minimum include: (1) A statement of principles governing the institution in the discharge of its responsibilities for protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects of research conducted at or sponsored by the institution, regardless of whether the research is subject to federal regulation. [FN187] Section 46.122 reiterates the requirements of section 46.103, clearly indicating that federal funding is conditioned upon compliance with the Common Rule (for federally funded research) and compliance in the course of all research with "principles governing the institution in the discharge of its responsibilities for protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects of research" [FN188] that are set forth in each institution's assurance. [FN189] What might not be obvious from a cursory glance at this provision is that nothing explicitly requires an institution to agree to abide by every provision of the Common Rule in the course of privately sponsored research. In fact, many assurances exempt an institution from one or more *921 of the Common Rule's requirements. [FN190] But this flexibility does not mean that these assurances are "voluntary" or illusory. There is nothing illusory about the agreement between the federal agency or department and the research facility. Once the exemptions to the Common Rule for privately funded research have been proposed and agreed upon by the parties, the assurance is a contract, complete with consideration and mutual assent. Indeed, under the Common Rule, a material breach of the research facility's obligations--if discovered--may result in termination of financial support. [FN191] Thus, federal funding is contingent upon the recipient's adherence to the Common Rule, and it is also consideration for the recipient's promise to abide by the agreed-upon standards for the protection of research subjects (i.e., the Common Rule, possibly with exemptions) involved in any of its research.
B. Enforcement Rights of Research Subjects
Assuming that the assurances are contracts, [FN192] the question remains whether human research subjects are intended beneficiaries of those contracts. [FN193] It could not seriously be contended that the contracts of assurance are primarily intended to benefit the facilities at which research takes place, rather than the vulnerable research subjects that the Common Rule is designed to protect. As the contracts of assurance consist mainly of a promise to abide by the requirements of the Common Rule--*922 thus extending that promise to all research, irrespective of its funding source--they are, by definition, for the benefit of the research subjects.
One might, however, question what "benefit" a participant in a nontherapeutic study expects to derive from her participation. After all, there must be a benefit accruing to a third party in order for that third party to have standing to enforce the contract. [FN194] A research subject participating in a nontherapeutic trial, for example, does not expect to receive medical "treatment" in the traditional sense; she is presumably a healthy volunteer. Her participation is much more likely to benefit future generations than it is to have any medical benefit to her personally. Moreover, in many cases, an injured research subject may not realize she has been harmed until her participation has ended, arguably mooting a suit for "enforcement" of the agreement. What, then, is the "benefit" intended for the subject? Can she truly be a "beneficiary" of the contract?
The answer lies in the purpose of the contract of assurance. The contract of assurance does not speak to the potential therapeutic benefits of the research, or to the goals of the research; it is not a contract to perform research. Rather, the contract of assurance provides the terms by which research protocols must be approved and carried out, when and if the research institution conducts medical experimentation involving human subjects. Viewed this way, it seems clear that the research subjects are beneficiaries of the contract. The entire purpose of the contract is to guard participants' welfare. The benefit to a research subject in a nontherapeutic trial is that she is able to participate in a study that will benefit future generations, secure in the knowledge that she is protected from undue risk to her health and the integrity of her private information.
According to the Restatement's formulation, however, research subjects must also be "intended"--as distinguished from merely "incidental"--beneficiaries in order to have standing to sue for breach of contract. [FN195] It is clear from the language of the Common Rule that human research subjects are intended beneficiaries to contracts of assurance. In sharp contrast to laws enacted for the protection of the general public, the Common Rule as codified expressly identifies the class of persons that DHHS sought to benefit. The regulations specifically set forth definitions of the persons who fall within the protected category of "human subject." [FN196] This definition is necessarily sharpened by limitations in the individual assurances between the funding department or agency and the research facility as to what the research will entail.
Moreover, the Common Rule is designed to ensure adequate protection of human research subjects, even at the potential expense of a *923 "greater good" for society at large. [FN197] This means that research subjects are a discrete and particular class of people, distinct from the population at large, whose interests are intentionally protected by the Common Rule and by the contracts of assurance executed pursuant to it. Courts should infer the requisite intent to grant enforcement rights in those jurisdictions that adhere to the Restatement's rigid test for third-party standing in the context of government contracts. [FN198] C. Advantages of the Third-Party Beneficiary Approach Given the many possible avenues of recovery for human research subjects, [FN199] one might question whether research-subject plaintiffs need an additional litigation strategy. Although plaintiffs have recourse to state tort law, they face significant obstacles to recovery. [FN200] The third-party beneficiary contract approach, therefore, may have broad implications insofar as existing tort law in most jurisdictions is inadequate to redress the harm sustained by human subject plaintiffs.
It makes little sense, however, to recognize a contract remedy if injured research subjects can only seek enforcement of the FWA between the research institution and the sponsoring federal agency in the form of specific performance. Although Professor Farnsworth notes that a third-party beneficiary "ordinarily has no right to restitution from the promisor," [FN201] he also points out that such a beneficiary "may have a right to restitution in the unusual situation in which the beneficiary has itself rendered a performance that is received by the promisor." [FN202] I submit that an injured research subject is an example of just such an unusual third-party beneficiary, thus giving the injured subject an incredible amount of leverage vis-à-vis the research institution. That is, if the third-party beneficiary can threaten a successful action for rescission of the entire contract as a result of material breach, research institutions will have a new powerful incentive to offer substantial settlements to injured subjects.
Conclusion
Some may protest that recognition of a third-party beneficiary enforcement right for injured research subjects would not alter the current state of affairs; after all, the most vulnerable research subjects are arguably those participating in privately sponsored research conducted at facilities that do not receive any federal funding and are, therefore, not bound by an assurance. Because federal oversight does not extend to all privately funded research, the government "cannot know how many Americans *924 currently are subjects in experiments, cannot influence how they have been recruited, cannot ensure that research subjects know and understand the risks they are undertaking and cannot ascertain whether they have been harmed." [FN203] We should not lose sight of the fact that, particularly in the context of genetic technologies, lack of jurisdiction over privately funded research raises serious concerns that the current regulatory scheme for protecting human subjects of research cannot be relied upon as the primary mechanism for preventing unethical experimentation or the inappropriate release of subjects' private information. Providing subjects with an additional legal tool in cases in which federal funds are involved, however, is a step in the right direction. [FN2]. Id. at 717. The researchers involved were later criticized for using a consent form in which the experimental drug administered to subjects in the study was described as "medication." Id. The consent form also failed to disclose that the drug was "not approved by the Food and Drug Administration." Id.
[FN3]. Id.
[FN4]. Id. at 717-18. [FN22]. These principles include the following: 4. Every biomedical research project involving human subjects should be preceded by careful assessment of predictable risks in comparison with foreseeable benefits to the subject or to others. Concern for the interests of the subject must always prevail over the interests of science and society. 5. The right of the research subject to safeguard his or her integrity must always be respected. Every precaution should be taken to respect the privacy of the subject and to minimize the impact of the study on the subject's physical and mental integrity and on the personality of the subject. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 15, at 16.
[FN23]. Id. at 14.
[FN24]. For example, in 1963, patients at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital were injected with live cancer cells without their consent. In that same year, patients at the Willowbrook School--a residential facility for mentally disabled children--were intentionally infected with hepatitis so that researchers could study the disease. [FN30]. National Research Act § 202(a) (directing Commission to "conduct a comprehensive investigation and study to identify the basic ethical principles which should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects"). [FN32]. Belmont Report, supra note 19.
[FN33]. Respect for persons incorporates two ethical conventions: that people should be treated as "autonomous agents" 103 . The assurance is a compliance agreement by an institution engaged in research conducted or supported by any federal department or agency that the institution will protect the rights and welfare of its research subjects. Id. These assurances provide a mechanism to require researchers to protect the rights of human subjects embodied in the Belmont Report. Compare id. § 46.103(b)(1) (requiring "a statement of principles governing the institution in the discharge of its responsibilities for protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects of research"), with Protection of Human Subjects: Notice of Report for Public Comment, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,194-97 (Apr. 18, 1979 ) (explaining need for informed consent, assessment of risks and benefits, and rules for the selection of subjects).
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